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THE REAL OF FAKE NEWS[1]

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Abstract

Fake news generated nowadays broad debates. The spread of fake news intertwines with the phenomenon of populism and the crisis of democracy. Indeed, the cornerstone of democracy, the freedom of public opinion, is the assumption that authenticity of facts is not altered. The separation of opinions from facts as the basis of democratic participation in political scene is the emblematic position of Hannah Arendt. But If it is acceptable that fake news must be countered by correct realism, we must be aware of the mutual implication of both terms at stake: subjects and reality. What is the real of fake news?

Key words

Fake news, populism, real, imaginary, symbolic, subject.

Resumen

Las noticias falsas generan hoy amplios debates. La difusión de noticias falsas se entrelaza con el fenómeno del populismo y la crisis de la democracia. De hecho, la piedra angular de la democracia, la libertad de la opinión pública, es la suposición de que la autenticidad de los hechos no se altera. La separación de las opiniones de los hechos como base de la participación democrática en la escena política es la posición emblemática

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de Hannah Arendt. Pero si es aceptable que las noticias falsas deban ser contrarrestadas por el realismo correcto, debemos ser conscientes de la implicación mutua de ambos términos en juego: sujetos y realidad. ¿Cuál es la realidad de las noticias falsas?

Palabras clave

Noticias falsas, populismo, real, imaginario, simbólico, sujeto.

Truth and subjectivity: A Lacanian approach

The debate on the spread of false news in communication and its political effects is now very broad and intertwines with the themes of populism and the crisis of democracy, whose cornerstone has always been the freedom of public opinion, on the assumption that the truths of the facts were not altered. This is the emblematic position of Hannah Arendt: the separation of opinions from facts as the basis of a widely democratic and participated approach in the definition of the political scene (Arendt, 1968, p.227-264). An approach that highlights the truth of facts accessible on the cognitive level, as a ground for a correct clash of interpretations.

On this basis we try to cope with a flood of pseudo-information spread worldwide on the web, often taken up explicitly or allusively by politicians, to be refuted after a short time. The political damage has already occurred. While it is true that lies and politics have always had a deep connection, and the manipulation of facts is an ancient instrument of power, the legitimate complains is that the excess of fake news and the impossibility of an effective control on the web changes the terms of the issue, threatening the very possibility of democracy. However, in this perspective there are no real solutions, except for the emphatic and poorly effective promises of web giants' self-censorship, which claims to introduce filters on social networks. Of course they do not block the fake news, but at least the hate messages that follow.

This legitimate and justifiable approach is embodied in a liberal and modern ontology and anthropology that clearly separates the planes of knowledge, will and power; the plane of factual knowledge – verifiable and 'objective' – by the one of emotion and passion. An aspiration that goes back to Plato. This approach is comprehensible and, I repeat, justified, but if it took on the complexity of subjectivity and reality in its relationship with the subject, it could pose the problem in a different way. Perhaps more effective than that.

If it is acceptable that fake news must be countered by correct realism, then it is necessary to become aware of the complexity and mutual implication of both terms at stake: subjects and reality. What is the real of fake news?

The true question here, is not in the wake of an often misunderstood Nietzsche, that there are no facts but only interpretations: on the contrary, the hardness of the facts, the material impact of discourses and powers on bodies, crossed by benevolent or repressive powers, the influence of imagination and ideology on concrete choices are unavoidable. If it is true that the analytic gaze is always immanent, situated and biased, this does

not mean the plane of facts is evanescent and manipulatible at will. On the contrary, the analysis is immanent to the plan of discourses of true, in their effects of power, it is involved in the power struggles that define them: a very concrete and material plan. Holocaust deniers - one of the most notorious fake news - are disproved by the hardness of material effects that have affected millions of bodies.

This essay limits the very wide issue of fake news and post-truth to the problematization of what is called reality, which is produced in the global communications network producing political effects.

The reality, which banally should coincide with the plane of the facts, is presented to the receptive and active digital instruments as the symbolic and imaginary multiverse in which we are immersed: it does not coincide with the Real. With his ultimate truth. What we affirm as reality therefore produces effects of truth, but the sense of the latter sinks in the Real, in the role that it plays in the subjections: fake news are a symptom of this game.

The terms I used announce the Lacanian angle of the speech. I believe that Lacan offers useful tools to analyze this issue because it problematizes the plan of ontology and that of subjectivity that is always involved in it (Zafiropoulos: 2001; Melman: 2002). Lacan is inserted in its turn in a post-foundational horizon that - starting from Nietzsche that constitutes its revolving door - problematizes the statute of truth, opening as much to a post-modern and deconstructionist devaluation of its statute as (and this is the case with Lacan) to the immanent dimension of discourses, processes of subjectivity constitutionally dependent on the social context, which separate the subject from himself and his truth (Stavrakakis: 1999, 2007).

In the Lacanian perspective, It is impossible, to separate the subject from the symbolic, linguistic, institutional and normative network in which the process of subjectivity takes place, but also to separate the cognitive from the pathetic, practical and unconscious. Language - the vehicle of communication with the world - is involved in subjectivity in a dynamic that we can define as pathetic and practical. Language is a cut in the living, a castration operated by the symbolic and the signifiers. Cutting and castration - necessary for the process of self-representation and identification - generate the surplus of the imaginary, the fantasy sustained by the libidic investment (Lacan: 1966, p. 495; Chaumon: 2004; Pagliardini: 2011). Taking its roots in the relationship of the speaking being with the drive and the insertion of the latter in the field of language, every human practice and all the more the communication can be thought as manipulation of the signifier, manipulation which, in turn, must be conceived in terms of prac-

tice and work (Mazzotti: 2000). This practice/work inscribes the impulse of language giving it form: it builds and invents forms through the linguistic symbolic apparatus in tension and surplus with the meanings: things and facts (Lacan: 1986). Evidently, a complex and impossible to interpret uniquely, at the centre of which lies the structural non-compliance of the symbolic and the imaginary itself: the defeat of symbolization and subjectivity. Today's chess is emphasized by the spread of the imagination, which shifts the symbols (which refer to coded meanings) towards the simulacra. This chess is the Real: the truth of the whole dynamic (Lacan: 1953, 1966). The third pole of the *borromean knot*. The real that never ceases not to enroll… cryptic definition that says together the failure of the symbolic transcription of the truth drive and at the same time the necessary and incessant repetition of the attempt of inscription (Lacan: 1974). I want to emphasize that the not inscribed residual drive is inherent to the same symbolic system. It is not something that is not grasped by language: The Real is within the communicative process and within the singular and collective subjectivities.

In short, the term *real* marks the distance from social and codified reality and refers to its true, real meaning: to the way in which the singularity seeks a precarious expressive and defensive balance in the world.

None of the terms is ever less completely, penalty the destructiveness of psychosis; but the latest writings of Lacan emphasize how, in the era of late capitalism, with the progressive evanescence of the limit (which, for our theme, is the authoritative truth function of the symbolic inscription-castration) spreads the imaginary identification of the ego, and the real, glowing nucleus of unregulated drive, "registered-not registered" expands to Lawless, becoming the center of the system (Pagliardini: 2016).

In the interminable decline of the Oedipus, the Real, which had remained in the classical-modern process of sublimation, becomes the pivot of unpublished subjectivities. A labile social bond/unbond is spreading, seeking immediate access to the *Thing* - while the Name of the Father becomes weak, pluralist, increasingly empty, whatever. You lose contact with the principle of Reality, you weaken the impact with the difference, submerged by signal differences, the virtuality: variants repeated without contradiction or opposition. In the rampant imaginary of narcissism and hyper-virtual social presentialism it is a fact the removal of the laborious process of self-building through the limit set by truths that transcend the immediacy of desire. The enormous bubble of the imaginary - which, as Carmagnola says, is the condition in which the surrender of a system of rules allows the exhibition of singularities - replaces the fatigue of sublimation and resolves in itself the symbolic (Carmagnola: 2002): the

signs are without delay, even affirmations, the *lalangue* spreads as background noise and a more or less conscious repetition of the already seen and already heard. It is the triumph of the social-web.

The friction of language with the truth of the real irreducible sign is lost. What remains is a *synthome* which does not *sign* anything, and does not testifies anything: There is nothing to overturn, nothing to cross, no braking friction: just symptoms to enjoy. What remains of the truth guaranteed by the Father's authority? It remains a hyper-production of forms, horizontal, disconnected, immersed in the urge of death, in the senseless repetition: *Lawless.*

Credit credulity belief: knowledge and/or communication

This attention to the truth of reality has nothing to do with a theoretical-cognitive judgment on the enunciations, and is clearly separated from knowledge and skills - what Lacan calls the university's discourse - which perform their function by distinguishing the true from the false. The discourses of science belong to a different plan that objective and stabilizes the ontological reality: a plan that is certainly precious, but to them escapes (or better consciously exclude) the complexity and the real truth of the relationship between subjectivity and the world, which governs much of digital communication and, in it, the formation of beliefs; therefore, directly or not, political consensus (Gori, Hoffmann: 1999, p.306-307). Functional to support the master/capitalist discourse, knowledge stabilizes an epistemic truth (the speakable and thinkable, Foucault would say); a truth which is not testimonial, immune and neutral to the galaxy of forces that revolve around the void of the subject: they programmatically ignore the real that motivates the beliefs and ignore its operativity in human affairs. The theoretical pretense of these knowledge takes them away from the dynamics of passions and the immense planet of the unconscious: they offer a solid and unquestionable platform, to a political rationality such as the neo-liberal one that tends to depoliticize social ties, so that they are managed by the acephalous and irresponsible mechanism of the market. This is not the place to discuss the claims of neoliberal governance and the naturalization of capitalism, but it is symptomatic that this neutralization of politics in the name of knowledge has managed the lives colonizing the subjective imagination of self-government and entrepreneurship. Denied by the endemic crisis, this imaginary has allowed a continent of removed passions and

emotions to emerge, pouring it into the net without the brake of cognitive knowledge, of the criterion of truth, right on a pathetic and practical level.

What is the nature of the famous fake news? At what level the fight against the threat to the Truth – still a pillar of politics – should be placed? If we accept the anti-fundamentalist assumption of the historicity of truths, of their taking place in the practices and contexts of power - and this is the post-structuralist perspective - it perhaps means that who-is-believed-true ceases to play the leading role that in the processes of subjectivity and in the organization of legislation, had in the West? Privileged place, which appears besieged by perspective, constructivism… But Foucault reminds us that we need to speak in terms of truth and falsehood, that believing in a truth is the root of our subjectivity, and therefore of politics (Foucault: 1976). The same fake news has effects on subjectivity in terms of belief, of believed truth. Only truth has power and only trough subjection to a regime of truth it is possible to exercise power.

The need for a stable statute of truth, at the end of the theological foundation, passes through science and the naturalization of the human. Everything that is declared nature and therefore scientifically objectionable, is stolen from political contention, by offering to human relations and politics a steady link to its naturalistic and scientific representation. The supposed neutrality of expert knowledge is constantly summoned by politics in order to silence any alternative politicization. What the living human is – how predictable he is, what is functional to his optimal growth – becomes less questionable, thanks to the decomposition of the same anthropomorphic figure in the molecularity of genomics and statistics that aggregate behaviors within algorithmic profiles transversal to individuals, so that they are manageable.

People know that. Politics know that. The space for contention and confrontation can no longer be found at the level of truth, if by this term we mean the codified processes of veridiction, assessed by scientific evidence and the control of expert communities. The truth is not a matter for everyone and not even for the many. Even in a Foucaultian and Nietzschean perspective of the irreducible connection of knowledge, power and subject - highlighting the government effect of truthful speeches on which the devices are incardinated - it is impossible to disassemble from within the today's dominant scientific statements. Starting from statistically verified data (even if they are elaborated without alternative perspectives to the productive optimization) they present the result as indisputable truth of the empiry: and the subjects, I repeat, are built around what is believed to be true.

The truth of knowledge is elusive for ordinary, inexperienced people.

So what? While the rationality of government mobilizes to its support the expert knowledge that obliges the political "consensus", the tumult of social coexistence seeks support rather than on the codified and certain truth, on the much larger galaxy of belief and belief-of-knowledge where the subjective and collective demands of survival and precarious affirmation are freed in an increasingly uncertain world. Starting from the domination that mainly determines living conditions - the economy - where the predominant role of finance, is only the emphasis on the centrality of credit.

Credit - rather than debt, a term burdened by theological, sacrificial and culpable ambivalences - is the heart of the socio-economic system. On credit and credibility - of individuals, states, enterprises - is based the game of risk: *game* rather than *play*. This game generates speculative profits, by betting on possible changes, *futures*, on trusts and vague expectation allocated by investors and savers, in a framework of unavoidable un-certainty. No truth, no certainty, just volatile news, rumors able to generate contagion, imitation, panic: only credit, probability, risk trust. Even the political consensus works on this feeling beyond the truth, which still – compared to the necessity shown by cog-nitive rationality – opens up spaces for expression and action. It works on not knowing but believing-to-know, trust, entrusting their expectations to a mediation that is be-lieved to be reliable, to promises that seem closer to expectations, to desires… With in-evitable reverses of mistrust, disappointment, emerging anguish of the lack of certainty. The diabolical combination of too much scientific certainty and absolute non-certainty - exasperated by the complexity of global interdependence, but also by the increasingly marked exclusion of the many from the elaboration of truth (an advanced company is distinguished by the role of 'expertise) - develops a paradoxical mixture of credulity (re-liance, passionate abandonment to the other, dependence) and cynicism (basic unbelief that winds up at the same time as each allocation of credit). Cynicism as shameless dis-play of falsehood, as exhibited disloyalty that fails to the true claim that should ethically bind those who affirm something as true (Ahi, sad end of the Arendt's promise and the courage of the Foucaultian parresiasta!) and that refutes without any problem what he has just said.

The capitalist economic *modus* to govern society has always been based on credit and uncertainty: to put it better, those are its driving factor. But the borders which used to stabilize the symbolic chain of credit/risk/promise through the moral or legal com-mitment guaranteed by the State (in Lacanian terms, the paternal function of limit) are now drastically weakened. So, the productivity of credit finance – in its inventive part

– is now ramping, multiplying the real weight of production. And this imbalance –beyond any realistic material basis of the economy – is reflected by the imbalance of web communication, by the eradication from places, territories, information, and from that kind of local knowledge that could be directly and intersubjectively verified (Mucchielli e Pommier: 2000).

Yet, the proxemics control, tangible even if imprecise - the world of the "more or less", faded into the abstraction of the "Universe of Precision" - finds a paradoxical recovery in digital media. As the abstraction of science moves drastically away from current experience and the expertise takes away any direct availability of truth, the uncertain returns in the combination of very remote and uncontrollable realities, medial and evanescent, and their visibility in live, shared, at hand, of touch. What we see live on the web, others see it at the same time, it seems more real and at hand…

A lot has already been written about these things by sociologists of communication (Furedi, Tyndall, Ferraris: 2017; Sunstein, Cass: 2017; Abbruzzese, Mancini: 2007; Fine: 2005).

What I would like to highlight is that the prevalence in human relationships of unbalanced credit and credulity with respect to certain and expert truths, shifts the theme of fake news from the cognitive regime of knowledge (with their aporia and power effects) to the practical, largely unconscious and non-cognitive dynamics of subjectivities. These depend on interrelations that are communicative and not informative, on imaginary and often paranoid identities called to compensate phantasmatically for the lack of solid grips. Fake news are a symptom of this dynamic.

The practical and pathetic self-referentiality of communication

What is or should be a communication? Evidently the semantic depth of the word refers to *cum*, and therefore to the relationship, to dialogue. Communication, better communicative action, is not by chance the ethical pivot of the political theory of Habermas which has a great influence on the liberal-democratic horizon. It tries in fact to face the sunset of the objective foundation indicated by Nietzsche or Foucault, with a symmetrical and reciprocal intersubjectivity that allows to legitimize or delegitimize the social arrangements. Once again, however, we must draw attention to the type of subject/subjects that are presupposed by this key of interpretation so influential, from which come the most heartfelt laments about the degeneration of

the media full of falsehoods. The habermasian subjects are in fact potentially rational and free subjects: the colonization operated by capital or passions does not affect the potential of the ethical and rational control of the intersubjective relationships. The "true" communication is dialogue and symmetrical and reciprocal relationality, to the point of being the ethical foundation to politics (Habermas: 1991).

Faced with this claim, there is the problematic reality of the relationship between world and subject.

A lexicon other than Lacanian could also be used: the important thing is that a dynamic of relationality appropriate to contemporary practices emerges. Lacan pushes the constituent relationship of the subject with the Other (symbolic and linguistic or simply the other from itself: however normative function of the true-believed), their mutual dependence, up to the extreme radicality: to the subject barred by the symbolic, formed through the gaze and desire of the Other, in a noncognitive but pathic dynamic, corresponds to an evanescent Other, in no case superimposable to Hegelian ethos or to us (lacan: 2006; soler: 2016; Hounie, beans: 2018). The Other-Truth (the authority to believe and trust, except that it holds the chain of signifiers) is an ordinary signifier, placed in being by the same barred subject and therefore always revocable. There is no stable pivot to build subjectivity. And this void is saturated in an only phantasmatic way.

This last thing that has a great political importance: the communitarian and communitarian aggregations are revealed more and more labile attempts to inscribe the real drive within a function of truth that is known to be precarious, the more emphatically asserted the more momentary and unstable it is, the less credible or temporarily believed. On the precarious transcending or point of aggregation represented by a false news, is thickened the mobile credulity in search of the lost father. The fickle and always disappointed imagination fills a real void that - in a Moebius ring - is a full of drive and obeys the need of this.

This interweaving is the true reference of communication, which does not look at the truth of symbols but at their use, at the practices in which they are introduced (Abbruzzese, 2001, p.218). The ubiquitous diffusion of symbols, images, icons shows a diabolical (from *syn-bolon* to *dia-bolon*) invasive will of meaning: symbolic and imaginary become generic terms, carriers of multiple uses. The superimposition of symbolic and imaginary makes the symbols - words, images - immediate, certain, unreflective and at the same time fleeting (Debray, 1992, p.17): we believe we know what we are talking about, but we cannot define it: winks, willingness to believe what confirms our feeling and doubt that it is really as we believe. Credulity and cynicism. It is a system of plat-

itudes that also applies in many different contexts, relatively stable but resistant to an analytic deepening, because its function is not theoretical.

The communication "takes for granted" an approximate but sufficient understanding within a conceptual cloud where repeats and changes what is repeated. Jean Jacques Wunenburger uses the term "proliferating image" for the penetration of media images into an active space of generation of the imaginary and symbolic (Wunenburger, 1997). The aim is not to know, but to pursue the Real which is enjoyment, satisfaction of anxiety, saturation of lack and uncertainty without subjecting to the normative nor to the unattainable scientific truth.

This allows us to reposition the question outside the theme of truth. Use prevails over representation. On the other hand, communication itself has no objectives outside of itself: it is always more contact, put in relationship. It would be better to use instead of communication the term connection, which gives the pulse of a relationship of signifiers without passage of meanings, a horizontal contact that it is possible to interrupt uniquely, that is given and taken away if it does not satisfy. A connection seeks the real of enjoyment.

The media space increases the decline of the informative purpose and focuses it on the self-referential drive to be there, to the enjoyment of contact, of the recognition without mediation of the struggle, without risk of life. To the imagination of a reality that revolves "all around you" autistic, at your fingertips, touch, you add the unmmediated enjoyment, the direct satisfaction of the desire to affirm the self, of a supposed power capable of influencing the facts of the world.

The digital device builds the world around a subject intended as an "I", not as a "Self". All within easy reach, the mouth talking, the hand touching the screen images. The compulsive exchange of messages and news is an exchange of all with all, but the contents, the meanings are calibrated on being expressive, affirming the ego, of the own image, being tiring and problematic to build it through truths concretely experienced.

Lacan affirms "Even if it communicates nothing, discourse represents the existence of communication; even if it denies evidence, it affirms that the word constitutes truth; even if it is destined to deceive, it speculates on faith in witness"(Lacan, 1966, p.245). and specifies: "the function of language is not to inform but to evoke. What I seek in the word is the answer of the other. What constitutes me as a subject is my question. To be recognized by the other, I utter what was only in view of what will be. To find him, I call him by a name he must take or refuse to answer me"(Lacan, 1966, p.292-3). It is the practical and pathetic purpose of communication: to show oneself as a subject, to

see the imaginary ghost in which one identifies oneself recognized. The main thing is not the meaning as such, but the meaningful function and the libidic economy that supports it.

The medium becomes fine. The staging of the means - and such are the false news - is significant of the way of being of the subject and is, as already for Simmel, the only true and only end of human action. But when the other/authority/truth that should operate the recognition and decide the true limit, is whatever and is placed by the subject himself, the dynamic turns on itself, becomes self-referential. This is what the conference on cybernetics observes (Lacan: 1978). From the anthropogenic desire that comes from the forbidden of an authoritative Other, we pass to the autistic enjoyment as real immediately accessible.

Foreseeable, in this perspective, the observations of Heidegger on the chatter and the misunderstanding:

> Rather than understanding the entity to which he speaks, we are concerned to listen to what the speech as such says. What is understood is speech, the over-a-what is only understood in an approximate and superficial way. The same things are meant because what is said is understood by all in the same medium…communication does not 'participate' the original ontological relationship with the entity of which one discovers, but the being-together is realized in discourse-together.

The authority and strength of this discourse does not depend on the meaning of this around which it discovers but on its pure spreading and repeating itself. " what it communicates is not the original appropriation of the entity, but the diffusion and repetition of the discourse. What-what-has-been-said as such spreads in ever wider circles and draws authority from it…the reader's average understanding will never be able to decide if something was created and conquered with originality or if it is the result of simple repetition of time. The average understanding will never even feel the need for such a distinction, since it already includes everything"(Heidegger: 1927, par 35).

Heidegger - anchored in the truth and its possible revelation - argues that the chatter (which today is assertive and to get attention, often violent and excessive) betrays the word, which is in itself openness, and the reversal in closing because it neglects to trace back to the foundation of what is said, preventing it from being re-examined. The philosopher therefore leads the theme back to truth and its betrayal, but

it also overshadows the self-referential dimension of the apparent relationality, the perverse dynamics of the which shifts the pivot of the authoritativeness of discourse from the relationship with truth to horizontal and unlimited repetition. Thus, obviously in different terms, both the enjoyment as unlimited compulsion to repeat, and the enjoyment of the paranoid closure in which the opening of the word is reversed (Bazzicalupo: 2012).

The truth of falsehood is given at this level: real because not conscious, yet operative. The prospect of a radical and rigorous Lacan shows that many criticisms of the digital world and its proliferating aberrations (as well as the exaltation of its possibilities) fail to grasp the heart of the matter. They place it on the level of the true and false, attributing to the denial of the true criterion, the responsibility of waves of credulity and reckless trust to the more or less populist leaders.

This digital communicative effervescence has indeed a political dimension full of risks, but its real is not of the order of knowledge, but rather of the subjectivity and the specific trade that, in the spread of the imaginary, the subjects have with the real of the enjoyment. Of course, it is not the network that has generated the uncontrollable need for recognition, self-affirmation, the need to be reassured about its existence and identity, socially threatened by global anonymity, by expertise that expropriates the living and personal fiduciary roles on which subjectivity was built. What is at stake, in the drive to communication/continuous connection and in real time, is something that has to do with subjectivity and its excess from the process of subjectivity, has to do with the relationship with reality, the drive. Obviously, digital tools have facilitated and intensified this need by changing the links between human beings. With the fluidity of texting, blogs, social networks, the relationship intensifies and becomes fluid: it becomes a connection, a contact that has the brand of power and offers a virtuality without obligation. Reality appears in the dimension of ungovered, self-referential enjoyment, compulsion to repeat, without sublimation,

Unregulated, which is rather saturated with a clik, an access without prohibition… It does not exceed the word, but spreads in a language (*lalangue*) without restraint (Lacan: 1975). Enjoyment of any subject, even the most peripheral and least powerful, to have contact and availability of the whole world. It exasperates the dynamics of the signifier who loses contact with the meaning; the word is assertive affirmation: of a fact as of an evaluation, without differences. He is able to use any meaning to attest to the subject. The web allows to enter the scene, to be potentially always present, thanks but at the same time also independently from the meanings used to be it.

Paranoia and fidelity to the friction of the symptom

Communication becomes a *modus* for the affirmation and enjoyment of the ego. The drive must be looked at, rather than cognitive, if we want to diagnose and eventually combat the effects of the fake. The ease with which it is possible to aggregate through a like to the news-announcements - of which it is important not the cognitive content but the emotional impulse, the appeal to side - pushes towards paranoid communities, marked, that is, by the pure sign without reference. The paranoid entanglement is defensive of the unlimited schizophrenic and individualistic dispersion that characterizes neoliberal management. It is the classic response to the anguish induced by the excessive openness of globalization and the web and the weakening of the codes generated by the evaporation of the father, function of normative truth. But the anguish of excessive openness to the world is accompanied by the loss of control over the truth of one's own self, which expert knowledge dissolves into numerical and statistical aggregates in which it is impossible to recognize one's own history, their pains and memories and their discomfort. The hunger for identity aggregation in which to recognize, takes shape through antagonism, enemy friendly borders, inside-out, that just the most excessive and improbable fake news mark, in an atonal, ambivalent world in which no clear and contrasting definitions are possible. The fake news and hate polity foment the paranoid politics that neither argues nor deliberates: mobilizes bodies and drives (which systematically deliberative theories ignore and exclude) through identity contrasts that draw enjoyment. Its success is linked to knowing how to deal with the complexity of subjectivity, with the Libyan background of in-common, with the practice of reality.

It is not a question of truth or lie, but of mobilizing - and exaggerated lies serve this - the imagination of people, soliciting the anxieties emerging from the uncertainty and instability of beliefs, and more or less directly, offer access to enjoyment. Both at the level of the immediate sensation of affirmation, power and participation, and at the level of covering personal fragility through belonging to a side, within a resentful and discontented group, which turns fragility into aggression. The right has traditionally a primacy in these practices.

These are not new observations and are probably shared by the same deliberative and rationalistic theory. The point is, however, that it merely condemns them as irrational, while it is only by taking on realistically this galaxy's drive and its ambiguous relationship with the symbolic, that it is possible to address the issue of web lies. We should not be shocked by the enormity of the lies, because it is not a problem of truth - which

is a very important issue of political criticism - but of practices of affirmation of the subjects that attest to a decisive change in the processes of subjectivity both individual and collective.

The subject of the imaginary, in the time when, as Lacan says, the master's discourse is the speech of the capitalist, modifies his phantasmatic production (Lacan: 1991). The desire is oriented by the consumer drive that saturates the void with gadgets, goods… objects… or - mixing the figures of the consumer and the producer, in prosumer - saturates impotence and lack to be with the production and consumption of news, virtual facts. These for their own enormity attract the attention of the followers: and so the subject, the ego, exists and draws from the enjoyment. While in turn followers, with a touch of the hand, are no longer alone, they become imaginary partners of a paranoid community.

Yet… the non-saying in communication, which exceeds the meaning of the totally devalued, is the ghost that governs the scene. The way of access to this non-saying, Real, is not the word as such, subject to satisfy the pathetic drive, but its being readable as a symptom, a symptom of the discomfort that is not composed. A discomfort so dense in libido and material that it can be active collectively and politically.

It would be necessary to recover that discomfort, the material friction of life, not expressed by the imagination but by the symptom not saturated by news-gadgets. And that's what people don't want. The *synthome*, if not silenced by the immediate satisfaction of enjoyment, within touch, would be the voice anamorphic, distorted, precisely falsified, unexpressed and unconscious psycho-physical discomfort. If it were taken over without occlusion, *synthomes* would give real power to the communication exchange insignificant or false. The lacanian injunction to be faithful to the *symptom*, means to be faithful to the breaking point that is at once heterogeneous to the dominant ideological field and but gives it form as it is the liminary of its closure (Lacan: 2005). Unfortunately, the critique of ideology reveals the extent to which this division has been blocked today.

In fact, the mixture of credulity and cynicism signals a desire adhesion that seems today to lose the character of the symptom - precious carrier of discomfort and conflict - to become the life form of our present, perverse-psychotic, incapable of distance, exposed to command while he seems to deny it, unable to structure himself around a truth that is not paranoid.

And then? All that remains is to propose again the laborious path of partial truths, but experiences and materially shared. By incardinating it on the partial and fallible truth of practices and experiences a critical subjectivity can be formed. And it is the

widespread practices of direct management, proxsemica of the local reality that indicate that this is possible, and that some, not all, feel the need. The need for truth and real reality, however much it may upset and cause suffering. The biopolitical dimension of politics is itself an indication of a renewed attention to the concreteness of bodies. The truths are experienced in the experiences of struggle or self-government located and shared, where the sense of action, of managing problems is not dictated by experts. But it emerges with the thickness and the friendly gravity of things lived on body, around which we can hope to construct a less *un-sensed* subjectivities.

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