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CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME AND THE GOVERNMENT OF EMERGENCY. A CONCEPTUAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS*

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RÉGIMEN DE CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO Y EL GOBIERNO DE EMERGENCIA. UN ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO CONCEPTUAL

Abstract

In his late writings, Bruno Latour identified a profound mutation of our relationship with the world whose outcomes relapse on the dimension of nature and the

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human species. The problem of the unity of the world that he evoked from the Anthropocene caesura coincides with a vision dominated by technology that leads to a planetary Climate Leviathan that, in other words, represents a previously unknown planned organization of natural phenomena. Our contribution aims at reflecting on the concerns that the New Climate Regime (and its relationship with the political) launches in a world challenged by the climate emergency. It empathizes that the adaptation of the political produce new techniques of the government of the emergency insofar as the demos – a reality constituted by bodies as political subjects– are excluded from crucial decisions which concern the political.

Keywords

Anthropocene, Climate Change Regime, Emergency, Latour.

Resumen

En sus últimos escritos, Bruno Latour identifica una profunda mutación de nuestra relación con el mundo cuyos resultados recaen en la dimensión de la naturaleza y de la especie humana. El problema de la unidad del mundo que evocó a partir de la cesura del Antropoceno coincide con una visión dominada por la tecnología que conduce a un Leviatán climático planetario que, en otras palabras, representa una organización planificada de los fenómenos naturales hasta ahora desconocida. Nuestro aporte apunta a reflexionar sobre las preocupaciones que el régimen del cambio climático (y su relación con lo político) lanza en un mundo desafiado por la emergencia. Se enfatiza que la adecuación de lo político produce nuevas técnicas de gobierno de la emergencia en la medida en que el – demos realidad constituida por un agregado de cuerpos, entidades biológicas y políticas – es excluido de decisiones cruciales que conciernen a lo político.

Palabras clave

Anthropocene, Régimen de Cambio Climático, Emergencia, Latour.

Introduction

In a series of conference papers, edited with the title *Face à Gaïa*, Bruno Latour invited the reader to reflect on a “transition” from a world to another. The passage implied a transformation whose outcomes relapse not merely on the physical-biological dimension of the Earth system, but also on the mere existence of human species. Latour referred to something as “*a profound mutation in our relation to the with world*” (Latour, 2017, 8). A New Climatic Regime emerges and the problem of the political asserts itself under new guises. The dilemma has its backdrop in the modern age when the contract to seek security through the State and the process of domestication of nature through the means of science took place.

By mentioning Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, Latour identified the transition phase to a New Climate Regime as the conclusion of an era: the Hobbesian sovran gives way to “this other Cosmocollus”, the Anthropocene (Latour, 2017, 227). For Latour, it not implies an ecological crisis but a sort of “*mutation*” (Latour, 2021, 38).

Environmental historians usually date the beginning of this “new planetary age” at the end of World War II.¹ This term indicates “that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have taken over from variations in solar radiation as the dominant influence on the climate and hence on the biology and physiology of the earth” (Northcott, 2014, 21-22). However, since the industrial revolution era, the impact of human activities on planet earth has played a decisive role in the substantial alteration of the climate (Jamieson, 2014). The late eighteenth century coincides with the beginning of a new energy regime based on fossil fuels. The intensive exploitation of oil, natural gas and coal made the economy of Great Britain – and later the global economy – flourish (McNeill & Engelke, 2014).

The year 1610 represented another relevant stage that historians usually associated with the beginning of the extirpation of the American Indians (Lewis & Maslin, 2015). This date probably embodies the modern character of the Anthropocene, up to its definitive affirmation that will take place in 1945, a *caesura* that someone defined as the “Great Acceleration”.² It implies that “what has been done by man, mainly between 1945 and today, will leave a mark of our passage on the planet, on its climate, on its ecosystem,

¹ The Nobel prize winner Paul Crutzen first identified the beginning of a new era called the Anthropocene, starting from his studies on the alleged effects of a nuclear war on the ozone layer of the earth’s atmosphere. His research led him to believe that since 1950 the great acceleration of gas emissions, combined with other factors, marked a caesura point and the beginning of the Anthropocene, see Northcott, 2014.

² McNeil & Engelke (2014) use this expression with a direct reference to Karl Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation*, a book published in 1944.

on the acidification of the oceans and elsewhere, which will remain indelible over the millennia to come” (McNeill & Engelke, 2014, 7).

These suggestions make intelligible the intrinsic, but also unavoidable, character of the Anthropocene, upon which the New Climate Regime consolidates itself and new adaptations of the political emerge. This contribution intends to offer an interdisciplinary reflection on the transformation. It will do it through the lens of the different methodological approaches of the authors. Firstly, it will introduce a conceptual discussion of the nature of climate change and its relationship with the political, also pointing out why the challenge of climate change should be prone to re-politicization. Secondly, it will investigate a crucial point arising from the adaptation of the political in the post-modern age, i.e., the criteria heuristically oriented of the techniques of government in the context of the emergency.

The paper follows this structure. The first part of the paper offers a historical philosophical reenactment of the categories of nature as political actor and its links with the New Climate Regime drawing from Bruno Latour and Carl Schmitt. It emphasizes a polemic struggle, i.e., a conflictual dichotomy, that the ecological mutation involves (Section 1). Nature, as political actor, refuses any instrumental approaches to climate change, that is a managerial technique whose employments are far to expect any possibility of tackling climate change. It brings us to discuss the plausibility of planetary management (what Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright rebaptize “Climate Leviathan”). However, as we will argue (Section 2), the advocacy of global climate justice is no longer a valuable instrument to grasp the climate change dilemma.

In the second part of the paper, we reflect on the fact that, in the regime of emergency, the adaptation of the political produces new forms of “governmentality” (in a Foucauldian meaning). Contemporary democracy has been characterized by radical mutations in the techniques of the government of the emergency represented by climate change (and, more in general, by environmental and healthcare emergencies). They have challenged the endurance of institutions vis-à-vis the *demos*, understood as population and aggregate of bodies, upon which the techniques of government build themselves. Hence, the focus shifts to the troubled relationship between governmental practice and the forms that the political can assume (Section 3). We reflect on some questions: who can be called to decide on collective issues with a close (and intrinsic) political meaning, as the dynamic of the Anthropocene will have irreversible outcomes on the human species and future generations? Which political regime will be desirable? Which strategic alliances or climate sophistication techniques/technologies will be legitimately prosecutable?

Climate change: a conceptual-critical outline: starting from Latour

In order to understand the evolutionary dynamics of climate history, it is interesting to consider the events surrounding the modern spread of European civilisation. The struggle for the conquest of the New World is connected to *spatialisation* practices, which gave rise to a new relationship with the Earth (and sea): a relationship of domination which has shaped political history as a dialectical opposition between different elements (Sferrazza Papa, 2021).

Latour draws upon Carl Schmitt's categories, comparing the German jurist to a toxic poison "kept in a laboratory for the moment when one needs an active principle powerful enough to counterbalance other even more dangerous poisons: it is all a matter of dosage!" (Latour, 2017, 228). In this passage, Latour presents Schmitt as he who has succeeded in grasping that space of modernity densely constituted by the (problematic and cogent) bifurcation between *physis* and *nomos*, between natural law and positive law (Latour, 2017, 230). Nature, hitherto envisaged as formless and chaotic space – let us think of Hobbes' *state of nature* – becomes subject to the hegemonic conquest of technology and state sovereignty, just as the *free space* across the ocean becomes a land of conquest, upon which a new legal order, the international one, is imposed. For both Schmitt and Latour, therefore, the technological turn is the linchpin in the changing relationship between human beings and the world (according to Schmitt, 2015a, 31, "in this pivotal period, an important technological event occurs"); the representation of the *globe* is the outcome of a relationship of domination, of a subordination process³.

The critical picture outlined by Latour is thus associated with the idea of change. His reflection on the concept of *Gaia* expresses the need to "repoliticize" the issue of climate change, not through a political redefinition of the question, but rather by emphasising the *polemical* – i.e., conflictual – aspect that the dilemma of ecological transformation entails⁴. In this sense, the controversial relationship with modernity concerns the need to defuse the conflict between European powers by means of the conquest and partition of the New World; the resulting international order coincides with the establishment of a balance based on the process of occupation of *terrae nullius* and the civilising of (non-human) humanity. Latour turns to Schmitt's radical and theological conservatism

³ The very image of the *globe* that emerges in the modern era reflects the need for the self-representation and legitimisation of the system of nascent states; European rationalism synthesises (and reduces) the vastness and diversity of *space* into a *map*, starting from a blank slate, see Farinelli, 2009.

⁴ Latour (Latour, 2017, 237) uses the expression "repoliticize ecology".

in order to rediscover those categories that have shed light on the *depoliticising* character of liberalism and the techno-industrial era⁵. The issue concerns the process of global Eurocentric standardisation and involves what Schmitt calls “the unity of the world”, understood as “the unity of the organisation of human power which is to plan, direct, and dominate the whole Earth and all of mankind” (Schmitt, 2015b, 271, *our own translation from Italian*).

According to Latour, another question arises. The dynamics of conquest in the modern era allowed states to mitigate their rivalries; the process of conquest and extension made it possible to imagine the pacification of the globe through the domination of European states. The transition to a New Climate Regime coincides precisely with the decline of the *ius publicum europaeum* and that international system⁶. In this regard, no new land to conquer can serve to defuse the economic and power rivalries between states, especially at a moment of transition in which what most attracts expansionist aims no longer extends above the Earth, but rather involves resources located *under the surface of the Earth* (Latour, 2017, 233). This is connected to the relationship between mining and quarrying practices and the significant increase in carbon emissions into the atmosphere. The contest between economic-productive powers in this area opens up a new scenario, with a twofold outcome: on the one hand, the race to seize resource-rich deposits – be they energy resources, rare-earth elements, or other materials indispensable for technological production⁷ – exacerbates geopolitical tensions, potentially leading to unpredictable and risky outcomes for the global order (Northcott, 2014); on the other hand, the impossibility becomes apparent of identifying a “sovereign arbiter” (Latour, 2017, 238) capable of acting as a neutral third party during phases of tension.

The emergence of the New Climate Regime envisaged by Latour is fraught with antinomies. It presents a new war of all against all, in which the unpredictable *Gaia* exerts her primordial force, at once creative and destructive. According to Latour, *Gaia* cannot be reduced to the symmetrical representation of the *Globe*; rather, it “can be defined as the multiplication of the sites in which radically foreign entities practice mutual ‘existential negation’” (Latour, 2017, 238). What lies on the horizon is not a scenario of

5 With regard to this point, an interesting critical interpretation is provided by Palano, 2018. In his view, Schmitt seems incapable “of truly moving beyond the horizon of liberalism”, as the most significant – as well as etymological – aspects of *nomos* reveal the determinism and “economic foundation” of sovereign decision-making (Palano, 2018, 107-112, *our own translation from the Italian*).

6 On the international law and the context of global climate change, see Adamin (Adamin, 2008, 67-87).

7 Interesting remarks on this point may be found in Crawford, 2021. She focuses on the advances in Artificial Intelligence and the material and mineral resources required to develop it. She criticises the definition of “clean technology” by emphasising its negative impact on ecosystems and environmental resources.

peace, since climate change – which concerns the transformation of our relationship with the world – cannot easily be contained by resorting techno-scientific forms of management, and the mere maintenance of the “cosmic vehicle” Earth, or by adopting technologies to re-engineer the planet (Latour, 2021; Sloterdijk, 2018; Northcott, 2018). The crucial point, which concerns the political, is related to *decision-making* processes in an emergency context: what political regime will be desirable, what strategic alliances, what climate engineering techniques/technologies will be legitimately pursuable or employable?

With the turning point of the Anthropocene, the problem of the unity of the world – evoked by Latour himself – has come to coincide with a dominant vision of technology in the contemporary system, a kind of technical development that “inexorably leads to new forms of organisation and centralisation. If technology and not politics is really the destiny of mankind, then the problem of unity can be considered solved” (Schmitt, 2015b, 272).

Towards a Climate Leviathan?

The point at issue in the transition to a New Climate Regime involves the public dimension and is intertwined with the political question: decision-making at a planetary level fosters a range of tensions, different perspectives, and different perceptions of the kind of risk associated with the state of emergency. Latour intuits that the prism of modern European sovereignty is the critical factor in the political re-framing of the ecological question; by retracing Schmitt’s uneven intellectual path, Latour stresses the need for fragmentation – the inevitable multipolarity of the terrestrial sphere.

The nostalgic turning towards a planetary sovereign, as a typically modern reflex, would no longer suffice to bring the world back to unity⁸. This not only amplifies and multiplies the scenarios of conflict between state actors and geopolitical areas, but also leads to an intensification of the struggle between *territories* and the very configuration of interests at the state and inter-state levels. The extent of the involvement of those on the fringes of the *demos* – understood here as the political-biological body – in the processes of identifying and choosing strategies and responses to cope with *change* is a decisive trait and requires us not to let “the nation-states occupy the stage all by themselves” (Latour, 2017, 262). What seems to be envisaged is an ecological reinterpretation of the awakening of territories through the appropriation of a sort of reverse sovereignty, as a

⁸ For a reading of Latour as a critic of modernity see Foessel, 2023.

response to the planetary sovereign who believed to have asserted his dominion once and for all (Latour, 2017, 263).

Latour's theory is framed within a broader ecological criticism of liberal capitalism by Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright in the book *Climate Leviathan. A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future* (Mann & Wainwright, 2018). They adopt an interpretative perspective inspired by Hobbes' political theory in order to decipher the character and extent of the state of emergency brought about by climate change. The configuration of planetary governance arrangements becomes a decisive aspect of the very capacity of the political to adapt to the process of ecological mutation. Thus, the authors propose four models – which we might call ideal types, in the Weberian sense of the term – to describe the potential forms by which the political, in its deliberative/decision-making sense, adapts to a phase of transition and instability in order to survive in the planetary future.

At a first level, these four models are distributed on two axes: two formations are distributed on the *capitalist* economy axis, the other two on the *non-capitalist* axis. At another level, the same formations lie, respectively, on the axis of *planetary sovereignty* and that of *planetary non-sovereignty*. The intersection of these formations through their distribution on the axes gives us a combination of possible, potential, and plausible patterns of political responses to climate change-induced transformations. What we have is a climatic Leviathan (capitalist axis, planetary sovereignty), a climatic Behemoth (capitalist axis, planetary non-sovereignty), a climatic Mao (non-capitalist axis, planetary sovereignty), and a “Climate x” (non-capitalist axis, planetary non-sovereignty). Regardless of the specific location of each model and its plausibility, the critical aspect highlighted by Latour concerns the feasibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy of these models as a decisive and adequate means to tackle the transition to a New Climate Regime.

Latour believes that the essentially modern development of Hobbesian sovereignty – be it at the planetary or the nation-state level – tends to define the problem by leading it back to the technical-administrative sphere, evoking a regime governed by means of “police operations” capable of ensuring a degree of coercive or manipulative intervention. In such circumstances, Latour adds, “Peace is given in advance” (Latour, 2017, 238). In the scenario that lies ahead, a war of all against all, peace must be constructed in each case by taking into account the political demands of nature – *Gaia* – that burst forth in all their destabilising and assertive power. In the New Climate Regime, which Latour calls “compositionist”, peace must be created “through the establishment of a specific diplomacy” (Latour, 2017, 238). The decisive issue for Latour

is to deconstruct the categories of modernity and decolonize the lexicon and concepts through which we interpret and orient the *transition* to a New Climate Regime, one that – Latour reiterates – “is in fact a new political *régime*” (Latour, 2021, 122).

This new political regime implies questioning the modes of conquest of the modern era, and the way in which European states defined the subdivision of the earth after the discovery of the New World. Furthermore, Latour sees in Schmitt’s critique of liberalism a source of inspiration for deconstructing the very dynamics of the capitalist economy, seen as a key factor in the increased modification and alteration of ecosystems. The long crisis of global capitalism can only represent one of the stages of transition to the new regime if we look at the opposition between Liberal Politics and Climate Politics (Northcott, 2014, 243).

Governing Climate Change Regime

Climate change regime impacts on every geographical scale, but its particular nature, extent and dynamics still remain a source of uncertainty. The complexity that lies behind these problems got worsen and became more gnoseologically opaque by the nature of the emergence that climate change posed to the planet. The spectrum of Climate Leviathan resurfaces in the light of the political emergencies of our time, which entail the need, often protracted over time, to redetermine the meaning of everyday life, to identify adapting strategies to the crisis and to face unknown situations (Collier & Lakoff, 2021).

By the concept of “emergence,” we must understand a temporary reorganization of society upon a multiplicity of interconnected (but, at the same time, differentiated) levels, whose consequences are lasting and weigh on single individuals and communities (Longo, Preite, Bevilacqua & Lorubbio, 2020).

From a certain perspective, the planetary healthcare emergency laid bare the intrinsic frictions between global political–economic regulation and local communities, drawn by Mann and Wainwright, which testify to the transformation of the existing form of sovereignty, enabling the world’s most powerful states to engage in planetary management. Providing for the emergency needs of the population, preventing and protecting them against dangers, and coordinating interventions in the event of catastrophes, are all the duties of every state. Any politics assumes a historical and geographical terrain to which it lays claim: these are the grounds on which the legitimacy of the nation-state rests because of the “specifically political character” of the capitalist nation-state.

On the other hand, collective duties should adequately promote the protection of people to seek out a stable effort to balance the opposing needs in terms of security and freedom, also giving more attention to the cultural aspects of emergency on political and social life (Beckett, 2013).

The ever-growing interpenetration of science and technology in people's lives, as well as in political affairs and economic interests is a concrete reality by now. In an increasingly complex and interdependent world – not only as regards communication networks, but also because of skill's interdisciplinary that the solution of social problems requires – the modes through which public decisions are taken must deal with the way public decisions are made in a society (Sobel & Leeson, 2007). Moreover, the puzzling epistemic problems upset climate justice-related issues and it challenges the belief that scientific knowledge is objective and can be more or less directly translated into political action (Grundmann, 2007). The discussion on strategies and policies implemented to deal with the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic crisis has suddenly influenced different aspects of human activity from politics to all social and economic relationships and, ultimately, life itself.

The way the climate change regime has been addressed in the public speech is one of the most relevant aspects of this mutation. Although they are aspects often considered on the sidelines of the scholarly debate, the immanent relationship with the political and its mutations, as well as the way the climate change regime, is transforming political and legal theories of sovereignty, legitimacy, and democracy. Far from being interpreted as an issue whose worth is heuristically delimited, namely as a prerogative of “technicians”, the climate change regime should be eminently understood as an ethical, social, and intergenerational problem (Pelling, 2010). For these reasons, it directly claims the political.

In his time, Foucault already observed a crucial transformation in the technologies of government that characterized modernity that includes a wide range of control techniques on population (Foucault, 2007). The term he coined to identify the reflection on the art of government and its transformations over time (“governmentality”) consists of the different techniques and strategies by which a society is made governable. Governmentality techniques organize the political and produce different forms of subjectivity through political (and economic, e.g., think about neoliberalism) means (Burchell, Gordon & Miller, 1993; Lascombes, 2004; Lemke, 2007). From a Schmidtian perspective, the Foucauldian criticism of power can be viewed as a new form of adaptation of the political where biopower constitutes a technology for managing humans in large groups, e.g., populations and aggregate of bodies (Lombardi, 2017).

For more than a decade, the climate change emergency arises the sensibility of political activists and global associations but the solutions that address it (think about the Green New Deal), although enlightened, are mainly inspired by techniques of government whose goal is to achieve the management of the political, a category that, in a broad sense, include both human life, bodies and the nature itself (the earth, the sea and so on). In other words, climate change continued to be framed as a scientific–technical problem, best addressed by a flexible adaptation “governance” translated into policies. (McHugh, Lemos & Morrison, 2021). Instead, according to Mann and Wainwright (Mann & Wainwright, 2015, 316), a materialist approach to these questions should “reflect on the manifest inequalities of power in a mode of global political–economic regulation currently constituted to a significant extent by liberal capitalism” because global climate justice has failed to produce a coordinated response to climate change (Bazzicalupo, 2018)

The increasing resort to measures to rule social problems (whose nature is relevant for the survival of humankind) in the regime of emergency through the means of government assigns public authority the monopoly of decisions that cover life’s aspects that directly concern the political. Hence, the assumption that public leaders can decide on issues that ground on the political and their relationship with human life adapt the political to previously unknown needs.

All these concerns also require a revision of the traditional interpretations of political representation and lead to the question of whether the adaptation of the political will produce a rearrangement of the democratic assets. Thus, against the ever-growing risk of a transformation of the demos’ instruments of participation and deliberation into a sort of epistocracy subordinated by experts provided with epistemic authority (Jeffrey, 2018; Bhatia, 2018), which would exclude it from crucial decisions in increasingly complex contexts, some conclusive reflections are needed. We witness a sort of dichotomy between the forces of nature and the interests that must be publicly represented. On one hand, there is nature, a political actor that refuses the technique, so we cannot attribute the climate change emergency to a unity of the world, where a *police state* can discipline human affairs by the means of technique. On the other hand, the demos are a reality constituted by an aggregate of bodies, biological and political entities, which are frozen out from crucial decisions which concern the political.

Hence, the adaptation of the political also becomes a normative issue as the concern is about which public actors are in the best position to discern collective issues whose consequences are articulated on the dynamics of the Anthropocene, that have

irreversible outcomes on the human species and the future generations. Who takes on the responsibility of deciding on definitive and ineluctable dynamics? Can we solve this dilemma through geopolitics or by an alliance between international forces like in power games? Otherwise, can public decisions be assumed based on the interests of capitalism and its adaptation to new needs, like the so-called Green Economy?

In the perspective of Climate Leviathan, radical climate justice (Climate x), a sort of incitement launched by Mann and Wainwright, might be an alternative practice of climate justice advocacy as it radically counterposes itself to a governmentality reason that pushes global political-economic regulation. According to the perspective of radical climate justice any global policies to counter climate change emergencies (i.e., global climate justice) must be rejected as supranational institutions cannot compete with the alternative ways the local community might pursue and which might better suit their interests (and not to mention that very often local community hold accountable global climate justice for the inefficiencies and inequalities that climate change regime brought to the planet).

Radical climate justice might allow us to get out of the paradigm of modernity so that it reaches a stage of post-modernity and “de-colonizes” the perimeter of the climate change approaches. Climate x might represent a rebuilding of the political space that the demos claim and, indeed, several attempts testify to this need, like the express trust and sensibility towards intersectional ecosocialism and intergenerational equity and justice (Foran, 2020; Singh, 2021). Nevertheless, it leaves some variables open. In fact, despite planetary warming accelerating ecological transformation, the adaptation of the political is not perceived as completed and it nevertheless does not yet signify a fundamental transformation of the grounds of the political.

Conclusions. Space for further philosophical pathways

Our contribution aimed to reflect on the adaptations of the political in the post-modern era starting from the caesura identified by Latour, which coincides with a profound mutation of our relationship with the world. Once the Anthropocene took its path and the acceleration of gas emissions provoked irreversible outcomes on life's planet, it is not possible to come back nor stop its effects on the political – a category that also includes nature as political actor and bodies as political subjects.

After retracing this fundamental mutation in the categories of the political and reflecting on the conflictual dichotomy evoked by Latour that the ecological mutation

involves, we retraced the contractions arising from the unity of the world. According to Mann and Wainwright the dichotomy seems to suggest that if planetary management of the world, i.e., a climate Leviathan, would emerge, it will do so as a transformation of the existing form of sovereignty, enabling the world's most powerful states to engage in a scientific–technical solution to the problem of climate change. The contradiction lies in the fact that nature as political actor is inevitably conflicting with technical management, which concretizes itself in the governance solicited by the planetary Leviathan. On the contrary, from our conceptual analysis state arise that the climate change regime should be understood as an ethical, social, and intergenerational problem.

We found a fruitful perspective that lies at the crossroads of Latour's ecological re-interpretation of territories, understood as natural entities that assume a political subjectivity, and the hypothesis of Climate x suggested by Mann and Wainwright. The aim to put together Latour's theory with the hypothesis of Climate x seems to be achieved by our contribution as both the conceptual frameworks produce new elements of deconstruction and decolonize the lexicon and concepts through which we interpret and orient the transition to the New Climate Regime.

We also framed this need through the lens of Foucauldian categories to stress that the adaptation of the political produces unknown techniques of government which appear diriment in the light of the emergencies of our time and entail the incessant necessity to redetermine the meaning of everyday life and to adapt new strategies to the crisis. The recent dispositions adopted by the United Nations on sustainable fisheries can testify to the needs, moved by the obduracy through which nature is framed in the technical-administrative sphere, employing governmental techniques to ensure a degree of manipulative intervention. A draft resolution underscoring threats of sea-level rise, loss of marine biodiversity, and marine debris has been unanimously approved by the General Assembly of the United States in December 2022. The decision aims to prevent the vulnerability of marine ecosystems on the forecasting of climate scientists to back up the future climate crisis. Hence, we concluded that the adaptation of the political is not perceived as a relevant political (and intergenerational) problem yet, but as a policy-related problem. Instead, nature should be also considered in its “non-human” agency to be a political actor *au pair* with another form of representation of the world. Within this space, Latour's reflections meet the Climate x hypothesis: the sea in its nature dimension reappears to claim a sovereign logical space, overturning the traditional forms of sovereignty.

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